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Introduction 
The public debate on fiscal consolidation is 
often reduced to an ‘austerity’ vs ‘growth’ 
question. As many claim, excessive fiscal 
consolidation (or ‘austerity’) would damage 
growth and thus not result in lower debt 
levels. Others rather insist on the inevitability 
of fiscal consolidation measures by stressing 
the unsustainable character of high debt 
levels and the risk posed by financial markets. 
This policy brief provides an overview of the 
question and explores the opportunity of 
adjusting the path of fiscal consolidation for 
countries in the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). 
This brief first puts public debt concerns in 
perspective by underlining the structural 
roots of debt increases (part 1). Part 2 
explores the alternatives to fiscal 
consolidation.  Particular attention is given to 
the interaction of fiscal consolidation and 
growth. As a result of this discussion, some 
guiding principles for effective fiscal 
consolidation are suggested. In this 
perspective, part 3 will deal with some 
remaining issues of the EU fiscal framework. 
Practical policy recommendations are 
provided in conclusion. 
1. Structural roots of public debt  
In 2012, public debt reached 93% of the 
eurozone GDP, almost 25 percentage points 
(p.p.) above the pre-crisis level. In nine 
eurozone countries, debt levels are above 
80% of GDP (notably the four biggest 
eurozone economies: Germany, France, Italy 
Fiscal consolidation is essential to 
ensure the sustainability of eurozone 
countries’ public debt. However, as 
a principle, consolidation should not 
be pursued at a pace unnecessarily 
undermining growth in the short 
term. Repeated downward revisions 
of growth call for the use of the 
flexibility foreseen in the EU fiscal 
framework. The Commission should 
adapt the deadlines for fiscal 
correction to prevent excessive, pro-
cyclical adjustment in 2013. In turn, 
adequate surveillance and 
coordination must ensure structural 
adjustments constitute the core of 
fiscal consolidation plans.  
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and Spain). After a peak of more than 6% of 
GDP in 2009, aggregate deficits still reach 
3.3% of GDP in the eurozone in 2012. 
Part of the recent debt rise can be directly 
imputed to the financial crisis and the 
ensuing economic recession. The 
discretionary fiscal stimulus launched in 2009 
to counteract the downturn following the 
financial crisis inflated deficits. Moreover the 
recession lead to an automatic decrease of 
fiscal revenues and increase of public 
spending which considerably affected 
governments’ balances. On top of this, banks 
had to be rescued and might require even 
more support if the guarantees granted by 
governments are called upon. 
However, next to these one-off and 
temporary causes, debts also have structural 
roots. In several ‘peripheral’ countries, 
macro-economic imbalances do not result 
from the crisis, but were instead revealed by 
the crisis. External financing and cheap credit 
channelled towards consumption and real-
estate bubbles fuelled unsustainable growth. 
This tended to mask competitiveness issues 
and allowed public spending to grow 
excessively. Some rebalancing now appears 
unavoidable.  
Moreover, other structural issues still loom.  
Debt levels are expected to rise further 
because of the population ageing. The 
implicit future liabilities – entitlements whose 
payments fall due in the future, such as 
pensions and other age-related public 
spending – are as much a concern as the debt 
legacy. Public age-related spending should 
increase on average by 4.5 p.p. of GDP by 
2060 in the eurozone1. Countries facing the 
greatest challenges are Belgium, Luxemburg, 
Slovenia, the Netherlands, Malta and Cyprus, 
                                                 
1 Table 1 in EU Commission, The 2012 Ageing 
Report, May 2012.  
where age-related spending should increase 
by more than 8 p.p. of GDP in the most 
optimistic scenarios2. 
2. Room for manoeuvre in fiscal 
consolidation 
Is there scope for adjusting the pace of fiscal 
consolidation? To answer this, we first need 
to stress the role of financial markets in 
determining the ‘sustainability’ of a country’s 
debt.  
Debt sustainability 
In theory, the sustainability of public debt 
depends on the country’s ability to repay its 
creditors. This ability relies on the capacity of 
the country to raise taxes in the future. A 
country’s solvency is thus hard to apprehend 
in practice. Moreover, a sovereign country 
may ultimately restructure its debt: 
willingness to repay – as much as ability – 
matters. 
Hence, assessing the sustainability of a 
country’s debt requires some judgement from 
the country’s creditors. In the end, it is up to 
them to estimate the price at which it is still 
sound to lend to a highly indebted country.  
From the country’s perspective, credibility is 
thus paramount. The borrowing country 
must continuously convince financial markets 
of its commitment to repay. The 
strengthening of EU fiscal rules and the urge 
to correct fiscal deficits should be perceived 
in this context. As Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal had lost market access and, at times, 
the sovereign bond yields of Spain and Italy 
were rising to threatening levels, eurozone 
governments needed to assure investors of 
their fiscal discipline. 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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Enough room for manoeuvre to adjust 
the pace of fiscal consolidation? 
The concern for high debt levels is thus 
closely linked to the concern for a possible 
market ‘sanction’ that would push the 
country to default. How would financial 
markets react should a country be allowed 
more time to reduce deficits and to bring its 
debt on a downward path – with ‘fiscal 
discipline’ allegedly relaxed? Two general 
considerations can be made. 
First, in the short-term, risks can be managed 
differently than by front-loading 
consolidation to allegedly reassure markets. 
Monetary policy can notably buy time. The 
ECB has assuaged much of the risk of a 
country losing access to the market, by 
announcing it stands ready to buy bonds of 
eurozone countries facing excessive market 
pressure3.  
Secondly, credibility should also be anchored 
in a longer term perspective. Therefore, 
governments will have to reduce their debt to 
‘safer’, more ‘sustainable’ levels. This is not 
only a commitment under EU fiscal rules but 
also a necessity. From a financial history 
perspective, debt levels of most eurozone 
countries are simply too high to be deemed 
safe. This implies addressing the structural 
roots of indebtedness. 
There is hence scope to adjust the pace of 
fiscal consolidation in the short term, if at the 
same time the objective of structural debt 
reduction remains anchored in national 
policies. I now turn to a discussion on the 
variables - notably growth - that affect this 
objective. 
                                                 
3 Via its programme dubbed ‘Outright Monetary 
Transactions’. See Vanden Bosch, X., ‘Preventing the 
rise of sovereign borrowing costs in the eurozone: 
what can the ESM and the ECB achieve?’, Egmont 
Paper, November 2012. 
3. Reducing debt levels: Alternatives 
to fiscal consolidation? 
Key parameters for reducing debts 
The effectiveness of fiscal consolidation in 
reducing debt levels is basically dependent on 
a few key parameters and cannot be 
contemplated on its own4. The country’s 
consolidation effort rise with the interest rate 
paid on its debt. Moreover, the higher the 
level of the debt stock, the larger the required 
effort. Inflation is not neutral either: higher 
inflation lowers the real debt burden. Finally, 
higher growth facilitates the debt-reduction 
effort as it allows for higher fiscal revenues 
and lower expenses. 
Among the variables determining the fiscal 
effort required, growth receives the most 
attention in policy debates. Acting on other 
variables is generally not considered as a 
viable policy option.  Allowing for higher 
inflation to reduce debt levels is still largely 
seen as a heretic view at odds with the EMU 
founding principles. A debt restructuration 
amounts to a technical default that would 
spook off remaining investors. As for a better 
control of interest rates, forms of debt 
mutualisation that would allow countries to 
refinance themselves at lower rates were 
considered but so far without success. 
Finally, resolving to ‘financial repression’ – 
measures forcing the financial sector to lend 
to governments at low rates – contradicts the 
free movement of capital in the single market 
(Art. 63 TFEU), and the ban on privileged 
                                                 
4 A standard debt accumulation equation provides a 
useful framework as four variables affect the stock of 
debt    : (i) the interest rate paid on the stock of debt, 
  ; (ii) the inflation rate of the GDP deflator,   ; (iii) 
the real GDP growth rate,    and (iv) the primary 
deficit-to-GDP ratio,   . 
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access of public authorities to financial 
institutions (Art. 124 TFEU). 
Fiscal consolidation and growth 
Higher growth should thus facilitate the fiscal 
consolidation effort. However, conversely, 
the cuts in spending and tax raises implied by 
fiscal consolidation tend to negatively affect 
growth. As such, some claim ‘austerity’ would 
actually be ‘self-defeating’: debt levels would 
not be reduced by fiscal consolidation. In 
economic literature, testing for this 
assumption involves calculating the size of 
the so-called ‘fiscal multipliers’, i.e. the 
change in GDP following a 1% of GDP 
change in fiscal deficits. For example, if a 
decrease of one euro in government spending 
causes 0.5 euro decrease in GDP, then the 
government spending multiplier is 0.5. If the 
multiplier is above one, there is a possibility 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio actually increases 
rather than decreases because of the effect on 
GDP. 
However, trying to aggregate into a single 
figure how economic activity would in 
general be impacted by fiscal policy is 
inherently delicate. A multitude of factors 
impact the multipliers across countries and 
time, and many assumptions underlie the 
economic models. There is thus no single 
multiplier but a multitude of multipliers, 
depending on the composition of the fiscal 
consolidation over time and across countries, 
its persistence, and the accompanying 
monetary and financial conditions. The issue 
was exemplified in a recent exchange of 
views between the IMF and the Commission 
on the possible underestimation by 
international organizations of fiscal 
multipliers, leading to forecast errors5. 
                                                 
5 O.Blanchard and D.Leigh suggested that actual 
multipliers may be higher, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7 in the 
October 2012 IMF World Economic Outlook (Box 
 
Because of its limitations, the academic 
debate on the size of fiscal multipliers 
(mostly useful to produce forecasts) tends to 
drift towards a mostly ideological one (to 
suggest policies). Considering the size of 
fiscal multipliers to design policies can be 
largely misleading. 
Beyond the size of fiscal consolidation, 
pace and quality matters 
Nonetheless, the debate on fiscal multipliers 
highlights two key points. First, the negative 
short term effect of fiscal consolidation on 
growth is larger during a recession. Negative 
spill-over effects are moreover likely when 
many countries consolidate at the same time. 
This essentially suggests that beyond the 
question of the size of fiscal consolidation, 
pace and coordination matters. Some fiscal 
space should be allowed for investments 
likely to promote future growth, like 
education, R&D and growth-enabling 
infrastructure. Moreover, there is no need to 
systematically try to balance the budget in a 
recession. Automatic stabilizers should be 
allowed to freely function whenever possible. 
A second important lesson is that the 
composition of consolidation is paramount. 
Quality rather than quantity matters. Not all 
types of tax policies and spending cuts 
equally affect growth. Most growth-friendly 
adjustment measures should be favoured. 
Crucially, consolidation should consist in 
measures correcting structural problems 
making the debt unsustainable in the long 
term, rather than in temporary or quasi-one-
off measures aiming at meeting a short-term 
annual deficit target. The former typically 
implies coping with the greying of the 
                                                                        
1.1). Many inferred this as evidence that austerity 
would be largely misguided. The Commission 
contested these results (box 1.5 of autumn 2012 
forecast). 
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population and a lack of competitiveness. 
The latter implies spending cuts or tax 
increases that can hurt growth in the short 
term while not improving it for the future. 
If these principles – quality and pace – are 
followed, fiscal consolidation will ensure debt 
levels are credibly and effectively reduced in 
the long run. Growth is not an ‘alternative’ to 
fiscal consolidation, but rather an essential 
complement. Reducing deficits remains 
unavoidable but this should be done at a pace 
that does not undermine already low growth 
in the short term or much needed productive 
public investments in the long term. As for 
the core of the adjustment, it should focus on 
structural measures that can ensure the long 
term sustainability of public finances. 
4. The EU fiscal framework: 
Ensuring the right pace and 
quality of fiscal consolidation  
Principles in the EU fiscal framework 
As discussed, fiscal rules should ideally 
promote the right pace and the quality of 
fiscal consolidation. A qualitative adjustment 
at a steady – yet not necessarily unduly front-
loaded – pace should be favoured. Therefore, 
countries should not be forced to correct the 
deficit that is due to sub-optimal growth as 
long as they pursue their structural 
adjustment efforts. Productive public 
investments should also be preserved.  
The EU fiscal framework broadly recognizes 
these principles. In particular, both the 
required yearly adjustment effort to correct 
deficits and the medium-term objective are 
expressed in structural terms (i.e. a cyclically 
adjusted balance net of one-off and 
temporary measures). Moreover, since its 
inception the SGP notably recognizes public 
investments and exceptional circumstances 
such as a severe economic downturn as 
relevant factors when considering the deficit 
levels6. However, some issues remain which 
at times make fiscal rules function against 
these principles. 
Pace issue: Nominal fiscal targets 
deadlines should take into account 
downward revisions of growth 
First, what mostly determines the pace of 
fiscal consolidation is the deadline proposed 
by the Commission and set by the Council to 
bring the overall deficit to the maximum 3% 
of GDP benchmark. Back in 2009, countries 
were requested to reduce their deficits to the 
maximum 3% ceiling by 2012 (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Italy) and 2013 (Austria, France, 
Italy, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain) at the 
latest. Germany left the procedure in 2012.  
Despite the fact that the eurozone is now 
forecasted to go into recession in 2013, 
targets have only been adjusted for Spain 
(2014), Portugal (2014) and Ireland (2015). 
Moreover, countries will pursue their 
nominal targets beyond this deadline.  This 
implies that many countries will consolidate 
in 2013 when a significant part of the deficit 
is due to sub-optimal growth (on average 
1.1% of GDP7). 
To grossly assess the size of fiscal 
retrenchment over 2012-2013, we can sum 
up the planned national consolidation effort 
mentioned in the 2012 National Stability 
Programmes to the extra effort required to 
meet the deficit targets for 2012. The extra 
effort is calculated as the gap between the 
2012 deficit forecast by the Commission and 
                                                 
6 According to Art. 126(2) and 126(3) TFEU, and 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and subsequent 
revisions. 
7 Average cyclical component of deficit, as forecasted 
for 2013 in EC Autumn 2012 forecast for selected 
countries (see figure 1). 
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the Member State’s own 2012 planned deficit 
as mentioned in its Stability Programme.  
Figure 1: Cumulative size of deficit 
reduction (2012-13) as % of GDP 
 
Source: Own calculations based on National Stability 
Programmes and Commission’s Autumn Economic 
Forecast, 2012 
Figure 1 shows the resulting total size of the 
adjustment effort8. It is quite substantial in 
many countries and should raise concerns. As 
a broad comparison, the much debated US 
‘fiscal cliff’ – automatic tax and spending cuts 
that were due to take effect in 2013 – 
amounted to about 3% of US GDP9.  In 
Europe, the planned consolidation might 
entail further contraction of growth in 2013. 
This is certainly not to be considered as an 
ideal pace in general. 
                                                 
8 As calculated, the total does not take into account 
any adverse circumstances that would require an extra 
effort to meet the deficit target for 2013 (e.g. financial 
sector support, downwards revision of growth, rise in 
borrowing cost, unanticipated negative effect of fiscal 
consolidation).  Figures also ignore extra measures 
announced between April and November 2012. Spain 
obtained a delay, spreading the result over 3 years 
instead than 2.  
9 Estimated fiscal tightening for 2013 (as % of US 
GDP) under fiscal cliff. See US Congressional Budget 
Office, Economic Effects of Policies Contributing to 
Fiscal Tightening in 2013, November 2012. 
Quality issue: Structural corrections need 
to be more prominently considered 
A second issue is that enforcement of 
structural consolidation efforts is relatively 
weak. In the SGP, a country must in principle 
pursue an annual correction of its structural 
balance by at least 0.5% of GDP. The target 
set for each Member States ranges from 0.5 
to 1% of GDP, depending on the size of the 
effort to reduce deficits and debt levels. 
However, the target of 3% of general 
government balance dominates this yearly 
structural adjustment effort target. When a 
country is about to lower its deficit down to 
the 3% deficit target – and hence leave the 
EDP –, despite a yearly structural effort 
below the set target, the Commission does 
not in practice judge the structural correction 
to be insufficient.  
Under the Commission autumn forecast, 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta deviate 
from their structural targets as shown in 
Table 110 (see next page). These countries 
might insufficiently address their structural 
fiscal imbalances and possibly rely too much 
on one-off measures to lower their overall 
deficit. 
Moreover, judging the structural composition 
of consolidation by setting a structural deficit 
reduction target has some known 
shortcomings. The structural deficit excludes 
two components from the general 
government balance: first, the cyclical 
component (i.e. the deficit due to below-
potential growth), and secondly, the 
temporary and one-off measures (i.e. deficit 
owing to discretionary measures having a 
                                                 
10 This is purely indicative but demonstrates how the 
structural effort criteria may lack teeth. Figure for 
Belgium do not take into account the measures from 
the 2013 budget, and hence underestimate the 
reduction of the structural deficit. 
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‘one-shot’ or ‘non lasting effect’). Calculating 
the cyclical component implies forecasting 
potential growth which is a delicate exercise. 
If ‘potential growth’ is overestimated, so will 
the cyclical component. The structural deficit 
might hence turn out to be larger than 
initially believed. Moreover, judging which 
measures have a ‘temporary or one-off’ 
rather than a ‘structural’ effect can be 
delicate. In an economy, with considerably 
high tax levels, further tax increases will 
qualify as structural measures, not temporary 
ones, while one could assume excessive 
taxation can only be reversed over time. 
Finally, while public investments and 
structural reforms (notably pension reforms) 
can in principle be accommodated under the 
SGP, it is still unclear how their impact on 
deficits should be considered in practice. The 
Commission has announced a 
communication on the accommodation of 
fiscal discipline with public investments for 
Spring 201311. Clarification is indeed much 
needed on the possibility of running larger 
deficits in the short term because of 
productive public investments that can 
stimulate growth. This also concerns 
countries under the EDP, and the 
Commission will hopefully address this issue. 
Conclusion  
Strengthened fiscal discipline constitutes the 
core of the European answer to the 
sovereign debt crisis.  The objective is not 
only to lower debts that have reached high 
levels, but also to continuously convince 
financial markets that the debt path remains 
sustainable. I argued the ECB’s bond buying 
programme can fend off most of the short-
term risks in financial markets, creating more 
room for manoeuvre for adjusting the pace 
of fiscal consolidation. 
However, if pace can be adjusted, credibility 
supposes that reducing debt levels must 
remain an overarching objective. Therefore, 
fiscal consolidation is unavoidable. Most of 
the complementary means are simply not 
considered viable policy options so far 
(inflation, debt restructuration, financial 
repression or debt mutualisation). As for 
growth, it is a complement to fiscal 
consolidation – rather than an alternative – 
that can facilitate the debt reduction effort.  
To preserve growth in the short term, both 
the pace and the quality of fiscal 
consolidation matter. First, the pace should 
take into account that the negative short-term 
effect of fiscal consolidation on growth is 
likely larger in a recession when many 
countries consolidate at the same time. 
                                                 
11 
Announced in Commission Blueprint for a deep and 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union, COM (2012) 
777. 
Table 1: Structural deficit corrections 
2012-2013 (% of GDP) 
  
E
ff
e
c
ti
ve
 y
e
a
rl
y
 
st
ru
c
tu
ra
l 
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
  
 
(1
) 
Y
e
a
rl
y
 s
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
c
o
n
so
li
d
a
ti
o
n
 r
eq
u
ir
e
d
 
(2
) 
D
e
vi
a
ti
o
n
 (
1)
-(
2
) 
F
o
re
ca
st
 l
e
ve
l 
 o
f 
st
ru
c
tu
ra
l 
d
e
fi
c
it
 (
2
0
13
) 
AT 0.1 0.75 -0.65 -2.1 
BE 0.35 0.75 -0.4 -2.7 
CY 0,55 1.5 -0.95 -4.8 
DE 0.5 0.5 0 0.3 
ES 1.75 1.5 0.25 -4 
FR 1.25 1 0.25 -2 
IT 1.65 1 0.65 -0.4 
MT 0.15 0.75 -0.6 -3.2 
NL 1.15 0.75 0.4 -1.1 
SL 1.1 0.75 0.35 -3.2 
SK 1.35 1 0.35 -2 
Source: Own calculations based on 
Commission Autumn forecast 2012 and 
Council recommendations 
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Deficits due to below potential growth 
should not be systematically corrected as 
growth is revised downwards.  
Secondly, the composition and quality of the 
adjustment matter to minimize the negative 
short-term effect on growth while 
maximising long-term growth prospects. The 
focus should be on structural adjustments, 
and notably on the correction of structural 
deficits.  
Adjusting the pace 
Although these principles are broadly 
recognized in the EU fiscal framework, its 
flexibility is not ideally used in practice. The 
pace is not optimal if most countries still plan 
to reach their deficit targets for 2013 despite 
repeated downward revisions of growth. This 
would imply excessive corrections 
concentrated on a short period. On a case-
by-case basis, the Commission should 
recommend the Council to grant a delay for 
meeting the 3% target owing to a ‘severe 
economic downturn’12. Ideally, this should 
occur before countries introduce their 
Stability Programme in spring 2013.  This – 
rather technical – Commission initiative 
would prevent countries to overly focus on 
their overall deficit targets and to 
unavoidably miss unrealistic targets.  
Ensuring an effective structural 
adjustment 
Adjusting the pace of consolidation should in 
turn be linked with closer scrutiny of the 
                                                 
12 According to Article 3(5) of Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97, the Council may decide, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a 
revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU, 
if effective action has been taken and unexpected adverse 
economic events with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances occur after the adoption of that 
recommendation. As a rule, the deadline can be extended 
by one year. 
quality of corrections. Structural issues owing 
to lack of competitiveness or the cost of an 
ageing population must be addressed. 
Allowing for more time should be 
conditional on effective structural adjustment 
plans. This implies effective surveillance and 
enforcement of the agreed annual reduction 
of structural deficits.  
Since no fiscal indicator can perfectly capture 
the structural effort, further strengthening 
policy coordination and surveillance is 
essential. In this respect, once adopted, the 
‘two-pack’ will allow closer surveillance and 
allow the Commission to voice an early 
opinion on national draft budget plans13. The 
recently suggested ‘contractual arrangements’ 
proposed in European Council President Van 
Rompuy’s report also offer an interesting 
perspective, linking closer scrutiny with 
solidarity mechanisms14. 
 
Xavier Vanden Bosch is Research Fellow at 
Egmont - Royal Institute for International 
Relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  See COM (2011) 821 and COM (2011) 819. 
14 See Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union, 5 December 2012. 
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